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I. INTRODUCTION
When people book vacations on cruise ships they envision the fun
they will have snorkeling, sightseeing and exploring the beaches.
Recently, however, the media and public advocates have begun to
scrutinize cruise ships for several reasons. A quick internet search will
turn up a plethora of public outcry demanding cruise lines fix problems
that passengers unknowingly face every time they go aboard a cruise ship.1
† J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2016; B.A., Business and
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When buying tickets, outbreaks of norovirus or sustaining a serious injury
are far from the mind of most passengers.2 These issues are quite
prevalent, however, and vacationers should be able to rely on the ship’s
infirmary to prevent the spread of serious illnesses and treat injuries.
Absent the minds of most passengers, cruise ship companies are
bound almost exclusively by nineteenth century maritime law which
differs significantly from the common and statutory law governing landbased torts.3 In what has become known as the “Barbetta rule,” passengers
are barred from bringing a medical malpractice lawsuit against a cruise
ship company for injuries suffered at the hands of medical physicians in
the ship’s infirmary.4 Unlike hospitals which can be held vicariously
liable for a doctor’s medical negligence, the Barbetta rule reflects the long
standing admiralty and maritime tradition that ship owners should not be
held vicariously liable for medical negligence occurring within the
infirmary because physicians are aboard the ship merely for the
convenience of passengers and cannot control the patient’s treatment.5
Under this logic, a cruise ship company bears no responsibility for onboard
medical negligence despite the infirmary being the only medical facility
passengers can access while at sea.
difficult stages in writing this Comment. Finally, I would like to thank my family and
friends for the love and support that made all of my success possible.
1 Seth Cline, The 8 Worst Cruise Ship Disasters, U.S. NEWS, (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/14/the-eight-worst-cruise-ship-disasters;
see also Meredith Galante, 10 Other Horrifying Cruise Ship Disasters, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/costa-concordia-cruise-ship-disasters2012-1.
2 Centers for Disease Control and Protection, Vessel Sanitation Program: Facts About
Noroviruses on Cruise Ships, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/vsp/pub/norovirus/norovirus.htm
(last updated Aug. 5, 2013) (providing facts regarding contagious noroviruses which spread
easy aboard cruise ships where many people are in close quarters).
3 Thomas A. Dickerson & Jeffrey A. Cohen, Medical Malpractice on the High Seas,
N.Y. L. J. 1 (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCert_pdfs/ Dickerson
_Docs/medicalmalpractice.pdf (“[P]assengers may travel on 21st-century cruise ships, but
their rights and remedies for injuries sustained on or off the cruise ship are governed, in
many cases, by 19th-century legal principles.”).
4 See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988).
5 Compare Bercel v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 21, 24–25 (Tex.
1994) (a patient may bring a negligence claim against a mental hospital despite the treating
psychiatrist’s status as an independent contractor because the hospital was required by
statute to ensure patients received “adequate medical and psychiatric care and treatment”),
and Blanton v. Moses Cone Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 457–59 (N.C. 1987) (a patient may
allege that a hospital is vicariously liable for the malpractice committed by the treating
doctor even though the doctor was not the hospital’s agent because based on ordinary
negligence at common law, a reasonably prudent hospital would have found it necessary
to ascertain the doctor’s qualifications prior to allowing him to perform surgery), with
Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988), and O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E.
266, 266–67 (Mass. 1891).
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The Eleventh Circuit, however, has recently taken a stand against the
Barbetta rule’s applicability to cruise ships in one of its latest decisions,
Franza v. Royal Caribbean.6 The Eleventh Circuit created a split between
the circuit courts by holding in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, which was the last case agreeing
with the maritime tradition and gave it a name – the Barbetta Rule.7
The intention of this Article is not to analyze possible reasons for the
validity of such a rule. Rather, this Article brings to light a newly-created
circuit split and suggests a solution based on a thorough analysis of the
issue. One of the questions this Article addresses is: how a hospital may
be held vicariously liable for medical malpractice committed by doctors,
but yet a cruise ship is usually exempt from the doctrine of respondeat
superior for identical medical malpractice claims? And in doing so, this
Article argues for the adoption of a uniform rule that dismisses the logic
behind applying the Barbetta rule to today’s cruise ships. By using the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Franza as the initial framework, this Article
offers a modern rule allowing passengers injured by onboard medical
malpractice to bring a claim against a cruise ship company. Only once
such suggestions are implemented uniformly will medical patients aboard
cruise ships receive the same protections afforded to patients treated at
healthcare facilities on land.
To develop a solution, the roots of maritime law must be examined
to interpret the complexities that make an easy solution to this problem
almost impossible. Part II of this Article offers a detailed synopsis of the
origins of maritime law that provides the basis for the Barbetta rule. An
understanding reveals that, in some respects, maritime law has drifted
away from other bodies of law. Part III addresses the circuit split at the
core of this Article. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barbetta relied on
traditional maritime law to deny a vacationer the ability to bring a claim
alleging medical malpractice against the carrier cruise line.8 The Eleventh
Circuit’s ruling finds that a passenger may bring a claim against a cruise
ship owner for medical malpractice committed by the carrier’s employed
physician aboard the ship.9 Part IV analyzes the circuit split between the
Fifth and Eleventh circuits and articulates possible solutions by analyzing
traditional maritime law in the context of the modern cruise vacation
industry. Lastly, this Article concludes by arguing that the other circuit
courts should adopt the Eleven Circuit’s conclusion. Not only does the
proposed solution provide fairness, but based on the circumstances of
6
7
8
9

Franza v. Royal Caribbean, 772 F.3d 1225, 1238 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id.; Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1367, 1369–70.
Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1367, 1369–70.
Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014).
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present day maritime law, it is no longer appropriate to apply century old
law to modern medical malpractice claims.
II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE BARBETTA RULE
A. Maritime and Admiralty Jurisdiction
Maritime and admiralty law is its own body of law with original
jurisdiction to hear such cases residing with the federal judiciary.10 The
Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases . . . of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”11 This means that the
federal courts will typically have original jurisdiction to hear any issue
regarding admiralty and maritime law. But what matters constitute
admiralty or maritime? Moreover, what substantive laws are federal
courts to apply to maritime and admiralty lawsuits?
Pre-twentieth century cases defining the scope of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction provided that such jurisdiction exists when the
wrong occurs on “navigable waters.”12 Over time, however, this simple
distinction became murky as cases arose in which the wrong originated on
land, but was later suffered on the water, or vice versa.13 To resolve this
problem, the Supreme Court touched upon the test for determining
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction by stating that not only must the wrong
occur on navigable waters, but must also bear a “maritime nexus – some
relationship between the tort and traditional maritime activities[.]”14 As it
relates to the issue at hand, onboard medical malpractice is a tort that bears
a maritime nexus to maritime activities and, therefore, is within the
maritime and admiralty jurisdiction.
The federal judiciary has explained that “with admiralty jurisdiction
comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”15 Without relevant
legislation from Congress, the federal judiciary is to impose general
maritime case law.16 The general maritime law is defined as “an amalgam
of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules,
modifications of those rules, and newly created rules” specifically tailored
to the admiralty and maritime industry.17 This explains the difference
10

U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
Id.
12 Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 34–36 (1866).
13 See e.g., Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933); Hess v. United States,
259 F.2d 285, 289–90 (9th Cir. 1958); Chapman v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962,
963–64 (1967).
14 Exec. Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 256 (1972).
15 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 864–65.
11
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between medical malpractice claims brought against a hospital versus a
cruise ship company. While a patient’s ability to bring a medical
malpractice suit against a hospital has been codified by statute and
recognized by case law, no statute allows for a passenger to initiate a
lawsuit against a ship owner for medical negligence.18 Moreover, the
relevant case law holds to the contrary by barring claims against the ship
owner for onboard medical negligence because a treating physician was
brought aboard for the convenience of the passengers and the ship owner
does not have any control over the treatment received by the claimantpassenger.19
B. Evolution of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against Hospitals and
Medical Centers
The sharp distinction between hospitals and ship infirmaries did not
always exist. In fact, hospitals and related medical centers once benefitted
from a broad protection from the doctrine of respondeat superior in part
due to the “charitable immunity doctrine” 20 which was applied in a similar
fashion to the Barbetta rule.
American hospitals were traditionally exempt from vicarious
liability arising from a doctor’s medical negligence.21 Hospitals were
predominately charitable institutions financed by religious organizations
and the philanthropy of the wealthy.22 The premise of the charitable
immunity doctrine was that hospitals should not be liable for negligent
treatment rendered by a doctor because these facilities were established
merely to help the sick and insane rather than profiting off attempts to cure
and prevent disease.23
Additionally, looking back to the 1800s, case law on this issue was
sparse because only a small percentage of physicians treated patients in
hospitals.24 Typically, doctors would visit, and even perform surgery, on
patients within their homes.25 As a result, identical to the Barbetta rule,

18 Robert D. Peltz, Has Time Passed Barbetta By?, 25 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 7–9 (2011)
(discussing guidelines that cruise ships adhere to, but noting the lack of regulations or
applicable laws aimed at protecting vacationers who seek onboard treatment).
19 See Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887); O’Brien
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266–67 (Mass. 1891); The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399
(9th Cir. 1918).
20 See Roger N Braden & Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding
the Evolution – Rebuking the Revolution, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 675, 677 (1998).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 678, 681; see also McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
24 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 677.
25 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 677–78.
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the charitable immunity doctrine took form and shielded hospitals from
vicarious liability arising out of a doctor’s negligence.26
At the turn of the twentieth century, advancements in medical
technology and the health care system spurred reformations of these
traditions.27 Hospitals were no longer considered secondary or lower-class
institutions for health care because the convenience of modern equipment
and a central staff attracted many doctors, drawing them away from
making house calls.28 Over time, health care institutions became an
accepted place to perform operations and evaluate patients. Even wealthy
patients who once preferred the comfort of their homes began to embrace
the centralization that hospitals were now able to provide.29
Gradually, heath care institutions grew from merger facilities reliant
on charity into complex medical centers focused primarily on
profitability.30 The control of hospitals began to transfer from the hands
of religious organizations and good Samaritans to the medical physicians
themselves or a board of directors.31 This conflict resulted in the erosion
of the charitable immunity doctrine as it became unequitable to shield
hospitals from vicarious liability while allowing such institutions to profit
from treatment rendered by their physicians.32
The medical malpractice system we are all accustomed to developed
from this evolution, and is premised on three primary justifications:
society finds it appropriate for an innocent victim to recover from the
negligent individual who caused the victim’s injury or loss; the innocent
victim should not be “rendered destitute, and socially unproductive”
because of a lack of financial means to remediate the injuries sustained’
and to serve as a deterrent effect for health care professionals and
providers to ensure proper services will be rendered in the future.33 To
accomplish these justifications, those who have suffered injuries or loss
due to a physician’s medical negligence may hold the professional as well
as the health care provider vicariously liable for the claimant’s damages
pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.34 Medical providers could
26

Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 678.
Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 677–78.
28 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 678.
29 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 678, (citing BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 32 (3d ed. 1997)).
30 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 681.
31 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 679.
32 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 679.
33 John Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability and
Disintermediation in Managed Care, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 307–309 (2001).
34 Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusion into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice,
Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 946–47
(1984).
27

2016] Are Cruise Ships Liable for On-Board Medical Malpractice? 321
be held vicariously liable on the basis of apparent agency.35 Accordingly,
courts began to utilize judicial-made tests to chip away at the charitable
immunity doctrine by establishing a hospital’s liability for a physician’s
negligence.36
C. Development of the Barbetta rule
New York federal court presided over one of the first cases
contributing to the development of the Barbetta rule. In Laubheim v. De
Koninglyke Neder Landsche Stoomboot Maatschappy, a passenger aboard
a steamship from Rotterdam to New York fell and severely injured her
knee.37 The passenger was escorted to the vessel’s surgeon, an employee
of the steamboat company.38 The injured passenger subsequently sued the
steamboat company alleging that the surgeon’s treatment was so poor that
her leg had to be amputated once she arrived in New York.39
The court stated that when a ship owner or carrier hires a surgeon,
the owner or carrier has a duty to ensure the surgeon is “reasonably
competent.”40 Thus, a ship owner or carrier can only be liable if it fails to
hire a “reasonably competent” medical professional.41 Since the
steamboat company exercised reasonable care and diligence in hiring its
surgeon, the company was not liable for any negligent medical treatment
the passenger claimed to have received onboard the steamboat.42
This shield from vicarious liability was further discussed in O’Brien
v. Cunard.43 In O’Brien, all passengers were required by law to receive a
vaccination prior to landing in Massachusetts.44 Accordingly, the carrier
employed a medical physician to administer the vaccination to all
passengers before the vessel reached its final destination.45 One passenger
sued the carrier after arriving in Massachusetts, arguing that she was
negligently vaccinated by the physician while aboard the vessel.46
The court reiterated that once a carrier decides to bring aboard a
physician, the carrier undertakes the duty to ensure the medical
professional hired is competent to perform all tasks reasonably expected

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id.
Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 680.
Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891).
Id.
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 266.
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of a physician aboard a ship for such a voyage.47 Because the carrier
satisfied its obligation to employ a competent doctor, the carrier was not
vicariously liable for any negligence committed by the physician in
performing the medical services he was employed by the carrier to
provide.48 Further, the court articulated that:
[t]he law does not put the business of treating sick
passengers into the charge of common carriers, and make
them responsible for the proper management of it. The
work which the physician or surgeon does in such cases
is under the control of the passengers themselves. It is
their business, not the business of the carrier . . . owners
of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical
officer when he attends [to] a passenger.49
From this holding, the federal judiciary formulated the law that will
eventually be termed the Barbetta rule.50 The ship owner or carrier’s duty
is merely to ensure it employs a reasonably competent and qualified
medical physician and supplies the professional with the equipment
necessary to properly treat those onboard.51 Once the ship owner or carrier
has fulfilled these obligations, a passenger cannot hold the ship’s owner or
carrier vicariously liable for negligent treatment rendered by the physician
because the owner cannot interfere or exercise control over the treatment.52
Additionally, an owner is not in the business of providing medical services
to its passengers.53 Rather, the physician is employed and brought aboard
for the mere convenience of the passengers who may elect to seek
treatment from the onboard medical professional(s).54 This logic was
47

Id. at 266–67.
Id.
49 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266.
50 See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating
that a cruise ship company can only be vicariously liable for an employed medical
physician’s negligence if the company negligently hired the medical physician at fault for
the claimant’s injuries).
51 See e.g., id., at 1369; The Great N., 251 F. 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1918); Di Bonaventure
v. Home Lines, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 100, 103 (E.D.Penn. 1982); Branch v. Compagnie Gen.
Transatlantique, 11 F. Supp. 832, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159,
159–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1904); O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891); Laubheim
v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887).
52 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267; see also Churchill v. United Fruit Co., 294 F. 400 (D. Mass.
1923); accord The Great N., 251 F. at 831.
53 Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 310 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see
also O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267; Di Bonaventure, 536 F.Supp. at 103.
54 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267.
48
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carried into the twentieth century where it was strengthened by subsequent
cases brought by passengers seeking ship owners be held vicariously liable
for onboard medical malpractice committed by the medical professional(s)
hired to administer treatment aboard the ship.55
III. THE BARBETTA RULE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star
extended this maritime shield to the cruise line industry by holding that
precedent establishes that passengers are barred from bringing a claim
against a cruise ship company’s negligent treatment rendered on cruise
ships.56 In Barbetta, a married couple vacationing in Mexico sued the
cruise ship after the onboard doctor failed to discover that Mrs. Barbetta
had diabetes while treating her.57 In July of 1986, Mr. and Mrs. James and
Florence Barbetta (collectively the “Barbettas”) filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the cruise
ship - the S.S. Bermuda Star (the “Bermuda Star”), the owner of the
Bermuda Star, and the company that chartered and operated the vacation.58
The Barbettas were vacationers aboard the Bermuda Star for a cruise
that departed from New Orleans and made stops in Florida and various
ports in Mexico.59 Shortly after the Bermuda Star departed from New
Orleans, Mrs. Barbetta became ill and sought the assistance of the medical
staff aboard the ship the following morning.60 Mrs. Barbetta was treated
aboard the Bermuda Star from January 26 until January 31.61 During that
time, Mrs. Barbetta’s condition continued to worsen. 62 She was finally
transported from the Bermuda Star on January 31 to a hospital after she
developed severe pneumonia and fell into a coma.63
The Barbettas sued the ship and its management for “[medical]
malpractice, neglect, carelessness, and negligence” committed by the
medical staff that treated Mrs. Barbetta aboard the Bermuda Star.64 The
Barbettas claimed that Mrs. Barbetta was originally suffering from a TypeA diabetes condition and the medical staff’s failure to properly diagnose

55

400.

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

See The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 159-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1904); Churchill, 294 F. at
Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1367, 1369–70. (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
Id.
Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1366.
Id.
Id.
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the illness resulted in the significant deterioration of her health.65 The
Barbettas claimed to have incurred $1,000,000 in damages which included
medical treatment, pain and suffering, lost wages, loss of consortium and
loss of service, society, and support as a result of the ordeal aboard the
Bermuda Star. 66 The Barbetta’s further alleged that the Bermuda Star, its
owners and management were liable because they failed in their obligation
to employ competent medical professionals and that the malpractice
occurred during the course and scope of employment rendering the named
defendants vicariously liable for the negligent medical treatment Mrs.
Barbetta received.67
In a matter of first impression, the District Court stated that a carrier
company is not vicariously liable in instances where the ship’s doctor
negligently treats a passenger.68 The court reasoned that under maritime
law, the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot apply to a carrier vessel
because there is no obligation to employ an onboard medical
professional.69 The court further reasoned that holding such parties liable
would result in carrier vessels refusing to bring doctors aboard a ship
entirely rather than to supply medical treatment as an added convenience
to passengers.70 Additionally, the ticket the Barbettas purchased contained
a contract with a disclaimer provision that made it clear that the doctor
aboard was not a “servant or agent” of the Bermuda Star, and that the
company would not be liable for the doctor’s malpractice.71 The District
Court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of all named
defendants.72 The Fifth Circuit subsequently took the case on appeal to
determine the issue of whether the doctrine of respondeat superior imposes
liability on the cruise ship company if a doctor employed by the company
renders negligent treatment to a passenger. 73
The Fifth Circuit relied upon the longstanding maritime principle that
if a carrier employs a doctor, it is done for the convenience of the
passengers and the carrier must only ensure that the doctor is competent
and duly qualified.74 But in either instance, a doctor’s negligence in
treating a passenger does not fall on the carrier.75 The Barbettas’ claim
65 Id. (alleging that had the doctor properly diagnosed Mrs. Barbetta’s condition she
would never have suffered from the later incurred medical emergencies).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1367.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1367–68.
73 Id. at 1368, 1372.
74 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369 (internal citations omitted).
75 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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was determined to conflict with general maritime principles which explain
that a medical physician carried aboard is present only for a passenger’s
mere convenience.76 Carriers are not bound by respondeat superior
because the ship owner or management of the carrier lack any meaningful
control over the doctor that would otherwise demonstrate the medical staff
aboard is the “servant or agent” of the carrier.77 The mere presence of a
doctor aboard a ship hired by the carrier for passengers’ convenience does
not equate to vicarious liability.78
The Fifth Circuit in Barbetta acknowledged the lone case endorsing
the only conflicting view and then immediately dismissed it.79 In Nietes
v. American President Lines, Ltd.,80 a California District Court opined that
a vessel’s medical physician that collects a salary from the carrier, is
regularly employed, and subject to the rules of the carrier and the owners’
demands is presumed to be an ordinary employee.81 Accordingly, the
carrier is vicariously liable for any malpractice or negligence committed
by the onboard physician.82 The Nietes court reasoned that the carrier’s
ability to exercise control over the treatment methods rendered by an
onboard medical professional is an unreasonable basis for refusing to hold
the carrier liable for the physician’s negligent treatment rendered to a
passenger.83
The Fifth Circuit stated that the Nietes Court misunderstood
respondeat superior liability by misinterpreting the carrier’s control over
the doctor’s general actions versus the requirement to control the doctor’s
treatment methods.84 In the context of maritime law, the carrier or ship
owner lacks “the expertise to meaningfully evaluate, and therefore, control
a doctor’s treatment of his patients and the power, even if it has
knowledge, to intrude into the physician-patient relationship.”85
The Fifth Circuit made one concession in the Barbetta decision.86
The court stated that while a carrier does not have an obligation to provide
medical personnel for passengers, the carrier does have the responsibility
of exercising “reasonable care to furnish such aid and assistance as

76

Id. (citing O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891)).
Id.
78 Id. at 1370–71.
79 See id.
80 Nietes v. Am., President Lines, Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
81 Id. at 220.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 220–21.
84 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1370–71.
85 Id.
86 Id. (citing 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES §39 (3d ed.
1975)).
77
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ordinarily prudent persons would render under similar circumstances.”87
But simply put, bringing aboard a doctor does not create a duty on the
carrier pursuant to respondeat superior.88
A. The Logic Behind the Fifth Circuit’s Decision: Summing up the
Barbetta Rule
To clarify, the issue at hand is governed by maritime common law
because these are tort actions claimed to have occurred while in navigable
waters.89 Maritime law and an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions and
circuits have “establish[ed] that a cruise line cannot be held vicariously
liable for the negligence of its ship’s doctor in the care and treatment of
passengers.”90 If and when a carrier opts to bring a doctor aboard for its
passengers, the carrier has the obligation of ensuring the doctor is
“competent and duly qualified.”91 The carrier’s duty is satisfied when the
carrier is deemed to have diligently inquired into the competency of the
doctor.92 If the carrier breaches this duty, it is responsible only for its own
negligence; never the negligence of the doctor.93 Under maritime
principles, the carrier’s only responsibility is to guarantee that an
employed medical professional is duly qualified and is a competent
medical physician.94
The basis for this principle in admiralty law contains two primary
justifications: a cruise ship does not possess the expertise to control and
supervise the doctor when treating a passenger and that the carrier does
not have any control over the patient-physician relationship that exists
between the passengers and the onboard medical staff.95 Therefore, a
passenger may bring a claim against a carrier for negligent hiring but
cannot seek relief under the doctrine of respondeat superior for medical
malpractice.96 The premise underlying this rationale is that there is no
maritime law that requires a carrier to bring aboard a doctor since they are

87

Id.
Id.
89 See Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1990).
90 Doonan v. Carnival Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2005); see also
Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir. 1988); The Korea Maru, 254
F. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1918).
91 Barbetta 848 F. 2d at 1371.
92 Id. at 1367–69.
93 Id.; see also The Great N., 251 F. 826, 826 (9th Cir. 1918).
94 O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 28 N.E. 266, 267 (1891).
95 Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1239–44 (11th Cir. 2014).
96 Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345–46 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
88
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not in the business of providing medical services.97 A ship is not a medical
facility and a doctor aboard a carrier is an independent medical physician
carried by the vessel for the convenience of its passengers.98 The
passengers are free to seek medical assistance by the medical staff aboard,
but such action does not render the carrier vicariously liable for the
medical staff’s neglect or subsequent malpractice actions.99
B. The Franza Decision Creating a Circuit Split
The Eleventh Circuit recently split with the Fifth Circuit when the
court ruled in direct opposition to the long-established maritime law and
allowed for a cruise ship passenger to bring claims against the carrier for
malpractice and negligence.100 In Franza, Pasquale Vaglio (“Vaglio”), a
passenger aboard a Royal Caribbean cruise ship, fell and suffered a serious
head injury while docked at the port in Bermuda.101 Vaglio was
subsequently taken to the infirmary aboard the ship.102 A nurse evaluated
Vaglio and found no further treatment was necessary.103 As they returned
to their cabin, the nurse informed Vaglio’s wife and family to be alert
because there was a chance Vaglio had sustained a concussion.104
Two hours later, Vaglio’s family called 911 while aboard the ship
explaining that Vaglio’s health had been deteriorating since leaving the
infirmary.105 The emergency team aboard was slow to respond, and the
medical staff refused to proceed without first obtaining a credit card
number when they finally wheeled Vaglio to the infirmary for the second
time.106 After another delay of more than an hour, the onboard doctor
evaluated Vaglio and prepared him to be transferred to a nearby Bermuda

97 See Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887); O’Brien
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891); The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399 (9th
Cir. 1918).
98 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369.
99 See O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266 (holding that carrier vessels are not liable under
respondeat superior because the treatment is under the control of the passenger rather than
the carrier).
100 See Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2014).
101 Id. at 1227. While there is some dispute as to where exactly Vaglio fell, it is certain
that Vaglio fell either on a loading ramp of the ship or on the dock itself. Id.
102 Id. at 1229.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1229. The expenses charged went to Royal Caribbean itself
because the company owned the infirmary and employed those that operated it. Id. This is
important to note because the origins of the Barbetta rule relied on the onboard doctor
being an independent contractor rather than an employee. Id. at 1234–35. Additionally, it
establishes control elements central to the continued validity of the Barbetta rule.
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hospital.107 Upon arrival, the medical staff at the hospital concluded too
much time had lapsed and there was nothing the hospital could do for
Vaglio’s internal injuries.108 Sadly, Vaglio was airlifted to a hospital in
New York the following morning, where he remained in intensive care
until his death a week later.109
On January 10, 2013, Vaglio’s daughter, serving as the
representative of the Estate, brought a claim against Royal Caribbean.110
Franza argued that, under the doctrine of actual authority, Royal Caribbean
was liable for the negligent acts of the onboard medical staff serving as
Royal Caribbean’s agents.111 In the alternative, under apparent authority,
Royal Caribbean was liable for having “manifested to [Vaglio] . . . that its
medical staff . . . were acting as its employees and/or agents,” and Vaglio
“relied to his detriment on his belief that the physician and nurse were
direct employees or actual agents [of Royal Caribbean Cruises].”112 The
District Court dismissed the case relying on the Barbetta rule reasoning
that the claims were “predicated on duties of care which are not recognized
under maritime law.”113
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that a ship-owner can be held
vicariously liable for medical malpractice pursuant to the agency
relationship Royal Caribbean possessed with the negligent medical
staff.114 Accordingly, Franza’s complaint alleging Royal Caribbean was
vicariously liable for onboard medical malpractice should not have been
dismissed.115 The Eleventh Circuit articulated that the existence of an
agency relationship in maritime law was a question of fact.116 The primary
consideration in finding a carrier liable under respondeat superior is the
carrier’s control over onboard workers as their principal.117 Thus, the
elements Franza was required to establish were whether: “the [carrier as]
principal acknowledge[d] the agent will work for it, the agent [manifested]

107

Id.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. The complaint initially contained a count of “negligent hiring, retention[,] and
training by Royal Caribbean” but was abandoned on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Id.
111 Id. at 1230.
112 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1230.
113 Id. (quoting Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331
(S.D. Fla. 2013) (noting that due to established maritime principles, Franza failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted)).
114 Id. at 1238 (emphasis added).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1235–36 (citing Naviera Netuno S.A. v. All Int’l Freight Forwarders, Inc., 709
F. 2d 663, 665 (11th Cir. 1983)).
117 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1236.
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an acceptance of the undertaking, and control by the principal; over the
actions of the agent [existed].”118
Franza’s complaint sufficiently demonstrated the medical personnel
aboard the ship were employed and paid directly by Royal Caribbean,
hired to work aboard the ship in the infirmary that was owned and
equipped by Royal Caribbean, wore Royal Caribbean uniforms and were
“under the command of the ship’s superior officers.”119 The Eleventh
Circuit determined Royal Caribbean had exclusive and total control over
the medical professionals aboard.120 With such a relationship readily
apparent, the Franza court concluded that adherence to the Barbetta rule
was improper.121
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the two prong control test relied upon
in past decisions, including Barbetta.122 As a policy matter, medical
professionals are expected to base treatment on their own independent
judgment.123 Thus, Royal Caribbean’s alleged inability to control the
doctor’s treatment did not eliminate the possibility of an agency
relationship.124 Additionally, the carrier’s inability to intrude into a
patient-physician relationship is not required for a carrier-doctor agency
relationship to exist.125 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found no problem with
treating the agency relationship between carrier and doctor the same as the
relationship between a land-based medical services company and a
doctor.126
C. Pleading Requirements Post-Franza
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the circuit split with the Fifth
Circuit and highlighted an additional method passengers injured by
onboard malpractice may take: apparent authority.127 Apparent authority
is an equitable theory that does not require claimants to establish the
control element maritime law emphasizes before a court may appropriately
impose vicarious liability upon the carrier.128 Therefore, apparent
118 Id. (quoting Whetstone Candy Co. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 351 F. 3d 1067, 1077 (11th
Cir. 2003)).
119 Id. at 1237.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1238–39 (noting that courts should no longer “discern a sound basis in law for
ignoring the facts alleged in individual medical malpractice complaints and wholly
discarding the same rules of agency that we have applied to other maritime tort cases”).
122 Id.
123 Franza, 772 F.3d 1225, 1239–40.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1241.
127 Id. at 1249 (“apparent authority is a distinct theor[y] of liability”).
128 Id.
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authority was recognized as the proper decision if the carrier’s conduct
equitably prevented it from denying the existence of an agency
relationship rather than having carrier liability contingent on the notion of
control elements.129
The Eleventh Circuit concluded it was improper to dismiss Franza’s
complaint because the doctrine of apparent authority is dependent on the
underlying facts.130 The Franza court determined that Royal Caribbean
represented the medical staff as its agents to Vaglio. 131 These
representations led Vaglio and his family believe he was under the care of
competent and duly qualified Royal Caribbean doctors that were
authorized to treat him on Royal Caribbean’s behalf, and Vaglio relied on
those representations and subsequent beliefs to his detriment.132 For these
reasons, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower district court’s opinion
and allowed Franza to bring a suit against Royal Caribbean pursuant to
respondeat superior.133
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
It can no longer be said that a medical physician comes aboard a
cruise ship merely for the convenience of the passengers. To a degree,
cruise ships are required to have an infirmary operated by several qualified
physicians.134 Almost without exception, cruise lines have agreed to
adhere to the standards established by the American College of Emergency
Physicians (“ACEP”).135 In their publication, the ACEP goes well beyond
requiring cruise ships to provide a well supplied infirmary for
passengers.136 The ACEP’s Health Care Guidelines for Cruise Ship
Medical Facilities outlines minimum credentialing and training standards,
and also includes medical policies and procedures that must be followed
when treating passengers.137
Cruise ships now use these infirmaries as an additional means of
generating revenue. When a passenger visits a ship’s medical center they

129 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1249–50; Huang v. Carnival Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1361
(S.D. Fla. 2012).
130 Id. at 1251–52.
131 Id. at 1252.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Healthcare Guidelines for Cruise Ship
Medical Facilities, ACEP Policy Statements, http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=29500
(last visited April 29, 2016).
135 Robert D. Peltz & Gretchen M. Nelson, New Destinations for Shipboard
Malpractice, 51 TRIAL 38, 40 (2015).
136 Id.
137 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, supra note 134.
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are charged a “reasonable fee” for medical treatment.138 Although cruise
ship companies have refused to disclose their pricing schedules for
treatment costs, research indicates that the costs equate to standard
American medical bills charged by American hospitals.139 Over the
counter medications may be offered for free in some circumstances;
however, other cruises have been reported to charge hefty sums for
Aspirin.140 While passengers can count on the cruise line ensuring the
pharmacy is fully stocked, passengers should expect to pay 10 percent over
retail at a minimum for prescription drugs.141 Passengers should not fear,
however, because although medical expenses must be paid out of pocket
immediately – akin to Vaglio being required to hand over a credit card
before seeing a doctor – cruise lines even offer medical insurance serving
as secondary coverage which will reimburse passengers for up to $10,000
in onboard medical services.142
The salaries paid to cruise ship physicians are significantly less than
American doctors employed by a hospital. The average ordinary physician
earns $189,000.00 per year.143 Conversely, doctors working aboard cruise
ships make around $80,000.00 less per year than doctors working in
American hospitals.144 Simple math demonstrates that when all factors are
equal, including prices charged for treatment, after deducting physician
salaries it is obvious that a cruise ship’s infirmary generates large revenues
for the cruise line. For these reasons, it is evident cruise ships are profiting
off of medical services and therefore it is not appropriate to allow cruise
ships to invoke the Barbetta rule.
The first justification supporting the Barbetta rule was that cruise
ships bring aboard a physician merely for the convenience of passengers
138 See Royal Caribbean Int’l., Feel Right at Home: Onboard Medical Services, All
About Cruising, http://www.royalcaribbean.com/allaboutcruising/accessibleseas/feel
RightAtHome.do (last visited April 29, 2016).
139 Teresa Machan, Cruise Passengers Warned Over Medical Bills, THE TELEGRAPH
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/cruises/news/Cruise-passengerswarned-over-medical-bills/.
140 Id.; see also Jim Hollander, Onboard Medical Facilities Have Cruise Passengers
Covered: Health Professionals and High-Tech Machines Are Available on Ships to Treat
Many Potential Ailments, LA. TIMES (June 26, 2005), http://articles. latimes.com
/2005/jun/26/travel/tr-insider26.
141 Hollander, supra note 140.
142 See Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2014);
see also Carnival, Carnival’s Cruise Vacation Protection, http://www.carnival.com/aboutcarnival/vacation-protection.aspx (last visited April 29, 2016).
143 Jacquelyn Smith, The Best- and Worst–Paying Jobs for Doctors, FORBES (July 20,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2012/07/20/the-best-and-worst-pay
ing-jobs-for-doctors-21.
144 Stephanie Chen, Trouble at Sea: Free-Agent Doctors, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2007),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119318197257869091.
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and are not in the business of providing medical services.145 In reality,
modern cruise ships have pledged to be bound by the ACEP standards
which require cruise ships to have an infirmary and several duly qualified
physicians aboard to treat passengers.146 Most importantly, cruise ships
are in fact in the business of providing medical services. Treating
passengers has become a lucrative source of additional revenues on cruise
ships.147 The change from providing medical treatment out of generosity
to profit-making resulted in the erosion of the charitable immunity
doctrine.148 The justification being that since hospitals shifted their
purpose from assisting the poor and sick to profit generating, they cannot
seek to utilize equitable immunities employed in the past to incentivize
goodwill.149 Thus, it is time for the rejection of the Barbetta rule because
while physicians in the past treated passengers for convenience, cruise
ships today provide outlined medical services for a profit.
The second justification for the Barbetta rule – that cruise ship
companies cannot be held vicariously liable because control over
treatment lies solely with the physician and patient – is equally
unconvincing.150 The Eleventh Circuit has provided a workable method
for imposing vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior
that should be adopted by the other circuits.151
The two-prong concept of control is most important to the validity of
the Barbetta rule: the carrier or ship owner is unable to dictate the types of
treatment rendered and cannot interfere with a patient-physician
relationship.152 These fundamental principles have been embedded in
nineteenth century maritime law.153 The justification was explained in
Barbetta:
The work the physician or surgeon does . . . is under the
control of the passengers themselves. It is their business,
145

See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir. 1988).
Am. College of Emergency Physicians, supra note 134.
147 Chris Gray, Cruise Ship Medical Bills That Leave You Feeling Seasick, Which?
Conversation: Health, Travel & Leisure, WHICH.CO.UK (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://conversation.which.co.uk/travel-leisure/cruise-ship-medical-bills-that-leave-youfeeling-seasick/.
148 See Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 33, at 307–309.
149 Jacobi & Huberfeld, supra note 33, at 307–309.
150 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369.
151 Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014).
152 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1368 (stating that control is a prerequisite for respondeat
superior in maritime law).
153 See id. (relying on O’Brien, Churchill, The Great Northern, and other relevant
decisions that reference the element of control lacking to satisfy respondeat superior
liability aboard ships).
146
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not the business of the carrier . . . The master or owners
of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical
official when he attends [to] a passenger. He is not their
servant engaged in their business, and subject to their
control as to his mode of treatment.154
Emphasizing this protection from the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was inappropriate to hold “shipping
companies” vicariously liable because the vessel is not “in the business of
providing medical services to passengers.”155 The rationale: the lack of a
“master-servant relationship” between the ship owner and the negligent
physician.156
The Eleventh Circuit, however, opted to take a favorable view of a
line of maritime cases that focused on whether it would be “unjust and
unreasonable” for a carrier to dodge responsibility for the negligence of its
agents.157 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that along with the recognition
of control, there is a long tradition in maritime mandating ship owners’
answer for the negligence of onboard agents.158 In referencing its broad
maritime jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit was never bound by the
Barbetta rule and “our experience and new conditions [sometimes] give
rise to new conceptions of maritime concerns.”159 The Eleventh Circuit
felt it was time to reject the Barbetta rule based on the circumstances and
mounting concerns pertaining to this unwavering traditional standard
safeguarding cruise line companies from onboard medical malpractice
claims.160
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that new conditions gave rise to
“new conceptions and maritime concerns” that required a shift in the
relevant legal standard.161 At the turn of the century, passenger vessels
were being used to transport people from one land mass to another and
doctors brought aboard to treat seafaring passengers were not as

154 Id. (quoting O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 267 (1891)); accord Churchill
v. United Fruit Co., 294 F. 400, 401–02 (D. Mass. 1923); The Great N., 251 F. 826, 831
(9th Cir. 1918).
155 Id. at 1369–70 (citing Amdur v. Zim Israel Nav. Co., 310 F. Supp. 1033, 1042
(S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
156 Id. at 1370 (citing Di Bonaventure v. Home Lines, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 100, 104
(E.D.Penn. 1982)).
157 Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2014).
158 Id. (citing The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 268 (1902); The J.P. Donaldson, 167 U.S.
599, 603 (1897)).
159 Id. at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160 Id.
161 Id.
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prevalent.162 Today, however, cruise ship owners are benefiting from this
same protection despite operating “state-of-the-art cruise ships that house
thousands of people and operate as floating cities.”163
The Eleventh Circuit took issue with applying the Barbetta rule when
ships are being used as traveling vacation resorts “complete with wellstocked modern infirmaries and urgent care centers” rather than
transporting individuals sprawled across the deck.164 Additionally, where
ships at the turn of the century would essentially disappear after leaving
port, modern technology allows for ships to be in constant contact
anywhere in the world.165 For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit stated
the Barbetta rule is used more as tradition than for “the strength of its
reasoning” and that “[t]he reasons that originally led other courts to adopt
the rule have long since disappeared.”166
While the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the requirement that a claimant
must show that the ship owner represented the doctor as its agent and that
the passenger relied on the representation to his or her detriment; the
Franza decision made the burden of proof easy to satisfy.167 Essentially,
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that vicarious liability may be imposed
under apparent authority when a ship owner’s conduct, or subsequent
inaction, can equitably prevent it from “denying the existence of an agency
relationship.”168 Therefore, a passenger bringing suit alleging medical
malpractice must establish these elements as well as facts that prove the
carrier had control over the treating physician or onboard medical staff.169
In Franza, the factors considered as “probative” of control in the
context of maritime respondeat superior (or apparent authority) were:
1. Direct evidence of the principal’s right to or actual
exercise of control;
2. The method of payment for an agent’s services,
whether by time or by the job;
3. Whether or not the equipment necessary to perform the
work is furnished by the principal; and

162 See O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266–67 (1891) (noting that a treating
physician was brought aboard for the convenience of the passengers).
163 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1239.
164 Id. (transporting people from one area to another was argued by many as the basis
for the Barbetta rule).
165 Id.
166 Id. (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410 (1975)).
167 Peltz & Nelson, supra note 135, at 40.
168 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1249–50.
169 Id. at 1236–37.
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4. Whether the principal had the right to fire the agent.170
Importantly, the entire medical staff were considered members of the
ship’s crew and were paid directly by Royal Caribbean.171 Additionally,
Royal Caribbean paid for the supplies and all medical equipment aboard
the vessel.172
After analyzing the circuit split, it has become clear that the Eleventh
Circuit’s rationale in Franza should provide guidance for the other circuits
in the future because far from solely transporting passengers from one
location to another, modern cruise ships have become floating resorts
attracting vacationers for onboard enjoyment.173 Drifting from traditional
maritime practices to the more modern tourist industry has caused some
confusion with how to apply maritime precedent since increasing business
also brings along additional liabilities. Cruise ships are not vessels
engaged in maritime shipping, nor the sort of vessel incorporated by
nineteenth century protections from respondeat superior and thus, not
protected by the Barbetta rule.
The Barbetta rule was established to protect shipping vessels from
liability when a third-party passenger was injured.174 At the turn of the
century, when a non-crew member was injured, a crew member or
someone brought aboard to assist the crew would render treatment.175 The
court-made rule then became: ship owners cannot be held vicariously
liable for negligent treatment because there was no duty to those third
party passengers.176 The rationale was that to impute vicarious liability
would result in a refusal to treat injured individuals at a time when ships
were isolated from the rest of world while out at sea.177
None of these characteristics or concerns can be attributed to modern
cruise ships. As a practical matter, cruise ships are not in the business of
“shipping” nor qualify as shipping vessels. Rather cruise ship owners used
their fleet of ships to take passengers around the ocean to enjoy a vacation
170 Id. at 1237 (citing Langfitt v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 647 F.3d 1116, 1120–21
(11th Cir. 2011)).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Royal Caribbean International, Onboard Experiences, http://www.royal
caribbean.com/findacruise/experiencetypes/home.do (last visited April 29, 2016).
174 See The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 160–62 (E.D.N.Y. 1904) (emphasis supplied).
175 See The Great N., 251 F.826, 830–33 (9th Cir. 1918); O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship
Co., 28 N.E. 266, 267 (1891); Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 781
(N.Y. 1887).
176 Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1369–70 (5th Cir. 1988); The Korea
Maru, 254 F. 397, 401–402 (9th Cir. 1918); Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 310 F.
Supp. 1033, 1038–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1881).
177 See De Zon v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 667–669 (1943).
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and then back to the home port.178 Instead of transporting passengers to
their new homes across the ocean,179 cruise ships are essentially floating
hotels that carry passengers on a week-long vacation before returning
home.
Essentially all cruise lines have pledged to adhere to the ACEP’s
guidelines on medical staffing and all other requirements.180 Since these
companies have agreed to such mandates it has become apparent that
cruise lines have agreed to employ a medical physician for more than just
the “convenience of its passengers.”181 Accordingly, cruise ships are not
traditional shipping vessels bringing aboard a doctor for convenience and
therefore cannot benefit from traditional protections afforded to shipping
vessels not in the business of treating passengers.182
While modern shipping vessels are outside of the purview of this
Article, this protection against vicarious liability cannot be imputed to
today’s cruise ships. The fundamental control elements of the Barbetta
rule are not satisfied by cruise ships.183 The evidence has shown that these
physicians aboard are part of the new age of infirmaries. These medical
centers house doctors and support staff who utilize the same equipment
one would find in an ordinary hospital.184 These doctors are provided a
salary directly from the carrier, bill for treatment under the carrier’s name,
are provided with all supplies and equipment, and report to higher ranking
crew members.185 This is more than sufficient to demonstrate that a
master-servant relationship, which was lacking a century ago, now exists
in the context of cruise lines.186

178 See Carnival, Explore Carnival Cruises, www.carnival.com/explore-carnivalcruises (last visited April 29, 2016); see also Royal Caribbean International, supra note
173.
179 Laubheim, 13 N.E. at 782.
180 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Cruise Ship Medicine Section – Cruise Line
Directory: ACEP Policy Resources, www.acep.org/cruise-line-directory/ (last visited April
29, 2016).
181 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1365.
182 An examination of The Great Northern, O’Brien, and other historical cases
discussed above articulated that the true meaning of convenience was nothing more than
merely having a medical professional aboard a passenger vessel. In Franza, this meaning
was applied to show that “convenience” cannot equate to supplying a medical infirmary to
passengers on modern day cruise ships as an additional source of revenue.
183 See Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1236–38 (11th Cir.
2014).
184 ROSS A. KLEIN, CRUISE SHIP SQUEEZE: THE NEW PIRATES OF THE SEVEN SEAS, 175
(ed. 2005).
185 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1240–41.
186 The Great N., 251 F. 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1918); O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co.,
28 N.E. 266, 266–67 (1891).
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Going forward, if cruise ship owners continue to engage in the
practice of offering medical treatment and advertise their adherence to the
ACEP guidelines, they should expect to find courts less inclined to apply
the Barbetta rule. Direct oversight of the actual treatment being rendered
will never again be the appropriate determination allowing carriers to
dodge vicarious liability under such circumstances.187 Even so, carriers
have gone so far as to make public their medical guidelines for potential
vacationers that dictate the medications that will be distributed (at a
determined price) and what treatments, including surgeries, the medical
staff will be on-call to perform.188
While the exact issue remains to be solved, the recent Eleventh
Circuit decision has provided the judiciary with the route to take when
hearing future medical malpractice cases occurring onboard cruise ships.
The Fifth Circuit applied the Barbetta rule out of tradition rather than
practicality.189 The elements essential to the nineteenth century maritime
case law were not present in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star. More
importantly, apparent authority allows vacationers to recover for the
negligent acts of an onboard physician.190 As a doctrine based on the
underlying facts, it is better aligned to tackle the confusion plagued by
maritime law on this issue. The traditional underlying facts that led to the
nineteenth century courts to establish protections from the doctrine of
respondeat superior are not present in the cases regarding medical
malpractice occurring aboard cruise lines. As such, the circuits must start
to rely less on the traditional Barbetta rule and more on the facts of the
underlying case to provide vacationers with the chance to bring a valid
claim for medical malpractice occurring aboard a cruise ship.
V. CONCLUSION
When people book cruise ship vacations they are excited to get away
and enjoy themselves. But most do not consider the hazards that
accompany a cruise excursion. As cruise ship vacations continue to grow
in popularity, outbreaks of noroviruses and passengers sustaining serious
injuries will unfortunately become more frequent.191 Even if a future

187

Franza, 772 F.3d at 1233; see also Peltz & Nelson, supra note 135, at 39.
Carnival, Is There a Doctor on Board?, www.carnival.com/CMS/FAQS/
Medical_Services.aspx (last visited April 29, 2016).
189 See generally, Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (failing
to discuss apparent agency and focused almost exclusively on the past decisions from the
turn of the century).
190 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1249.
191 See Cruise Market Watch, Growth: Growth of the Cruise Line Industry,
www.cruisemarketwatch.com/growth/ (last visited April 29, 2016) (providing statistics
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passenger is cautious, he or she reasonably expects the medical services
offered aboard the ship will provide proper treatment services. But what
cannot be anticipated by passengers is an onboard physician’s mistake of
negligence. At the heart of this Comment, a passenger may not have a
cause of action against the cruise line for a physician’s medical
negligence.192
The current circuit split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
presents both Congress and the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
resolve a conflict 100 years in the making. Providing a remedy to this
circuit split will finally bridge the gap between medical malpractice claims
instituted against a hospital and those brought against a cruise ship
company. Additionally, it will prevent future economic and physical harm
to passengers who suffer injuries due to negligent treatment inside a cruise
ship’s medical center. Accordingly, clarifying this discrepancy between
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in favor of the Eleventh Circuit is a unique
opportunity to create bright-line pleading requirements while ensuring
passengers aboard cruise ships are adequately protected from otherwise
latent dangers.

indicating the significant rise in the amount of passengers carried worldwide and the
additional cruise ships built in recent years to meet this demand).
192 See Franza v. Royal Caribbean, 772 F.3d 1225, 1238 (11th Cir. 2014).

